The H-Bomb
The Soviet Union exploded its first atom bomb on August 29, 1949, in Siberia.139 U.S. planes detected the
fallout. On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced: "We have evidence that within recent weeks an
atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R." The President added, "Ever since atomic energy was first realized to
man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always
been taken into account by us."140
Edward Teller called fellow atomic scientist Robert Oppenheimer and asked what to do in response to the news.
According to Teller, Oppenheimer replied: "Keep your shirt on."141 But for Teller and others demanding more
federal monies to develop weapons, the revelation that the Soviets had the atom bomb provided a strong additional
argument. The nuclear arms race was on!
A few days later Time commented on "a change in mood and tempo. Military planners were suddenly faced with
a whole new timetable of strategic planning. . . ." Under the subheading "Red Alert," Time declared that "with atom
bombs and bombers in the hands of an enemy, the Army and Navy, as well as the Air Force, took on new and
immediate importance. If the U.S. wanted security, it would have to buy the full, costly package."142
While virtually everyone recognized that a nuclear war would cause unprecedented casualties and suffering, few
people realized that more insidious peacetime effects were already under way. Routine operation of the atomic
weapons assembly line—exposing an increasing number of Americans to radiation under normal conditions—was
taking its toll. Ironically, Americans became primary victims of their own country’s nuclear weapons program.
Like other major nuclear decisions before and since, the hydrogen bomb go-ahead came first. Public comment
was welcome later. When it came to atomic development, the general public was in a position of reacting to one fait
accompli after another. And proliferation of radiation victims followed as a consequence.
As the new decade began, the White House, Defense Department, and Atomic Energy Commission were
coordinating hush-hush meetings about the H-bomb—a weapon involving fusion of hydrogen into helium. The
required high temperature of hundreds of millions of degrees would be possible only from an atomic bomb
detonation—so A-bomb capability was a prerequisite for triggering an H-bomb’s "thermonuclear" explosion.
Scientists estimated that if an H-bomb were possible, it could bring about one thousand times the explosive force of
an A-bomb.
Albert Einstein was among those in 1950 who viewed current events with trepidation. Within the U.S. he warned
of "concentration of tremendous financial power in the hands of the military, militarization of the youth, close
supervision of the loyalty of the citizens, in particular, of the civil servants by a police force growing more
conspicuous every day. Intimidation of people of independent political thinking. Indoctrination of the public by
radio, press, school. Growing restriction of the range of public information under the pressure of military
secrecy."143
It was in this atmosphere that deliberations over whether to proceed with H-bomb research reached their climax.
That secretive process is important to understand "because it is one of the relatively few cases where those who
explicitly tried to moderate the nuclear arms race came within shouting distance of doing so," according to Herbert
York, the first director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory where much of the hydrogen bomb R and D
subsequently took place. Behind the scenes there was, in York’s words, "a brief, intense, highly secret debate."144
Under federal law a key source of recommendations for the Atomic Energy Commission was its General
Advisory Committee. Called upon by the AEC to take up the question of prospective H-bomb development, the
Advisory Committee—chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer and including such luminaries of nuclear physics as Enrico
Fermi and I. I. Rabi—met in late October 1949. While urging continued efforts to magnify the power of atomic
weaponry, the Advisory Committee urged that the United States not plunge ahead with developing the H-bomb, also
known as the "super bomb."145
The panel presented arguments in terms of military strategies, technical aspects, and optimum use of present
nuclear resources, concluding that the H-bomb was not needed for U.S. national security. The report also depicted
the H-bomb choice as a profound moral issue: "It is clear that the use of this weapon would bring about the
destruction of innumerable human lives; it is not a weapon which can be used exclusively for the destruction of
material installations of military or semi-military purposes. Its use therefore carries much further than the atomic
bomb itself the policy of exterminating civilian populations."146
An addendum to the Advisory Committee report, written by James B. Conant—later president of Harvard
University—and signed by five other committee members including Oppenheimer, underscored the moral moment of
the H-bomb decision: "Let it be clearly realized that this is a super weapon; it is in a totally different category from
an atomic bomb. . . . Its use would involve a decision to slaughter a vast number of civilians. We are alarmed as to
the possible global effects of the radioactivity generated by the explosion of a few super bombs of conceivable
magnitude. If super bombs will work at all, there is no inherent limit on the destructive power that may be attained
with them. Therefore, a super bomb might become a weapon of genocide."147
These and other anti-H-bomb scientists were in effect muzzled from openly expressing their viewpoints at critical
junctures, held back by security-clearance status. Thus in the crucial months before Truman proclaimed his decision
on H-bomb development, the public was allowed little information about a decision that could potentially result in
millions of deaths and change the course of human history.
In top-secret circles the debate was fierce. Senator Brien McMahon, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, confided in Edward Teller that the anti-H-bomb Advisory Committee report "just makes me sick."148 For
their part McMahon and a constellation of atomic scientists, including Teller and University of California Radiation
Laboratory director Ernest Lawrence, were determined to bring about development of the H-bomb as soon as
possible, believing it to be the best possible response to Soviet possession of the atom bomb.149
Teller went out of his way to tell Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists readers at the time: "The scientist is not
responsible for the laws of nature. It is his job to find out how these laws operate. It is the scientist’s job to find the
ways in which these laws can serve the human will. However, it is not the scientist’s job to determine whether a
hydrogen bomb should be constructed, whether it should be used, or how it should be used. This responsibility rests
with the American people and with their chosen representatives."150 But in the real world—as Teller well knew—
secrecy restrictions prevented the American people from participating in the deliberative process until the basic
decisions had already been made at governmental top levels, by men very much like himself.
The Pentagon provided important support for the hydrogen bomb. Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, Military
Liaison Committee chairman Robert LeBaron, and, less strongly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged proceeding with the
H-bomb.
Most of the five-member Atomic Energy Commission opposed development of the H-bomb, at least for the
present. But commissioner Lewis Strauss vehemently argued that the AEC’s Advisory Committee had
inappropriately raised issues of morality.
In a letter to President Truman in late November 1949 Strauss urged approval of a crash program to come up with
the H-bomb. Strauss—who later became chairman of the AEC—warned that the Soviet Union could be expected to
develop the H-bomb. "A government of atheists," Strauss added, "is not likely to be dissuaded from producing the
weapon on ‘moral’ grounds."151 Neither would a government of Christians and Jews.
On January 31, 1950, President Truman announced he was ordering full-speed-ahead research and development
for the H-bomb.
139. Prior to the first Soviet atomic test, in 1948 and 1949, public speeches by a number of high-ranking American generals had contended that a preemptive
nuclear attack on the Soviet Union’s major cities and industrial centers might be a good idea. (See Fleming, The Cold War, p. 391.)
140. York, The Advisors, p. 34.
141. Ibid., p 63.
142. Time, October 3, 1949, p. 7.
143. The H Bomb, pp. 13-14.
144. York, The Advisors, pp. ix, 2.
145. Ibid., pp. 150-159.
146. Ibid., p. 155.
147. Ibid., pp. 156-157.
148. Ibid., p. 60.
149. Ibid., p. 45.
150. Ibid., p. 71.
151. Ibid., p. 58.